NGOs, amidst a masket ball:
their contributions and their risks
By: Constantino Casasbuenas
M.
In Colombia, NGOs have existed
for over 25 years during which they have built a social identity and have
woven a fruitful network of people and institutions that work to strengthen
Colombian civil society. Without claiming to be the only actor in society,
nor the principal one, these NGOs have behaved like ants, each of them
acting within its respective area of work (local, regional, national or
thematic) to make a contribution towards this goal. We do not mean to minimize
their role or their impact by calling them "ants". Rather, we want to express
that the result is greater than the arithmetical sum of their individual
activities. The ant community is much greater than the sum of its individual
ants, and so are the complex communication networks and the division of
labor that is generated within the ants nest.
At present, Colombian NGOs
form an institutional grouping which expresses itself as a search for the
respect and observance of human, civil and political rights in all of Colombia.
This connects them in the particular ways to the diverse expressions of
our society and to its problems.
Though they are often lumped
together under the single label of NGO, they are profoundly heterogeneous
and varied. Although the majority work within a framework of ethical values
which provides a foundation for their actions, their projections are in
fact quite varied: social development, humanitarian aid, political influence,
charity and assistance, research and training, information and communication,
and a very long etcetera. Consequently, their reality cannot be
simplified, nor can they all be put into a single box.
The "phenomenon" of NGOs
in Colombia occurred as part of a world-wide trend, though it was somewhat
"delayed" here. Even though for some see NGOs as another "Colombianism",
they are a significant reality in the majority of countries in the world,
both in the North and in the South. This reality responds to the irruption
of "civil society" -a social phenomenon which it is easy to name but about
which we still have much to learn. Obeying a similar "phenomenon" of civil
society, NGOs in the North are very differ greatly in their tasks, their
missions and their mandates. In the South they respond primarily to problems
of scarcity and deficient access to all sorts of rights (civil, political,
economic and cultural) by the majority of citizens. In the North there
are two main types of NGOs: those which respond to a crisis of the "welfare
state", and others -which have existed for more than 40 years (the ones
we call "agencies" here)- whose principal mandate is to exercise solidarity
and support of development projects (these NGOs are referred to here as
Agencia). Among these NGOs there is a group (which is not very large) that
caries out humanitarian aid activities in response to disasters and situations
that are considered "emergencies" in countries like Colombia, while adhering
to principles of neutrality, impartiality and solidarity with those who
are most affected.
Thanks to the solidarity
that has developed among NGOs in the North and in the South, the latter
have been able to develop their fields of action and to consolidate institutionally.
At present it is unthinkable to assume that either acts independently of
the other. On the contrary, in fact, whatever the field of activity (habitat,
women, the environment, conflicts, international commerce, extractive industries,
etc.), we find a rich weaving of networks that cover a rich and complex
national and international reality capable of expressing itself and of
exercising influence on institutions at all levels. The march of the ants
is world-wide in nature.
NGOs and colombian's internal
conflict
It is not new to state that
we find ourselves embroiled in an unconventional internal war that has
lasted more than forty years. This is a conflict that involves, in a differentiated
way according to the region, four armed poles: the guerrilla, the self-defense
groups1,
drugs traffickers and the regular Colombian army. Peace-oriented NGOs act
in each of the regions, in the midst of the conflict. They total more than
3,500 NGOs (according to a census that was produced by the Colombian Confederation
of NGOs, in 1994). Our war is not uniform in all regions. In each of them
differentiated alliances emerge along the four poles that have been mentioned.
Four differentiated visions are generated simultaneously (from each of
their points of view) regarding what each of them "imagines" NGOs are and
do. The masked ball begins!
These four differentiated
visions produce a framework of (in)security that becomes more complex,
brutal and profound in those regions where a variety of interests are at
play. These include land ownership (Cauca and the Atlantic Coast) and large
economic projects (Casanare, Chocó and the Amazon). It is less intense
(with respect to the open war) in intermediate and large cities such as
Calí, Medellín and Bogotá, where however, an additional
danger is generated by so-called social violence, which has its own characteristics.
With the election of Andres
Pastrana as president, we have entered a peace process that formally got
underway last January 7th. In these four short months, the process has
evidenced several of its difficulties. Thus, we know when it started, but
we do not know how long it will last nor the complexities it will bring
with it since the particularities and complexities of our process make
it different to those of Central America, South Africa, or other regions
of the world. Despite the change in strategies that have been implemented
by several illegal actors in the conflict, they all share the following
features:
-
Brutality, expressed in indiscriminate
massacres (more than 350 dead during the last three months) is used to
exercise territorial control of regions such in Uraba and Caquetá.
-
Kidnappings, torture and selective
murders occur, such as those suffered by two members of the Committee of
Solidarity with Political Prisoners or that of a member of the Unión
Patriótica (Patriotic Union) and a member of the CUT.
-
Defining staff of NGOs as military
targets (the retention of members of IPC expresses the other side of the
strategy: to seek political recognition of the AUC as a belligerent group).
-
The kidnapping and murder of
three North American indigenous activists by the FARC.
-
The hijacking of the AVIANCA
plane and of its 46 occupants by the ELN.
To sum up, these are some of
the main features of a dirty war that has seriously affected numerous social
movements (the Indigenous movement, political movements –such as the UP–
demobilized guerrillas, the union movement) and which is now starting to
affect NGOs.
In the midst of the conflict
and along with other social actors, NGOs have contributed to articulating
the social movement for peace which was first strongly expressed through
the "Citizens’ Mandate for Peace" and , later on, by the Permanent Assembly
of Civil Society for Peace. This movement pressures actors in the conflict
to and the brutality of their actions and to adhere by International Humanitarian
Law. This is a juncture that could well last several of the years that
the peace process may last, and it may present several scenarios:
Scenario N°1: "Normal"
development of the peace process. Aggression is either maintained or
intensified, while several actors achieve the power to negotiate better.
The humanization of war and the respect of International Humanitarian Law
is yet to be achieved. The social movement for peace becomes more eloquent
and stronger. And, the self-defense groups sustain their effort to be recognized
as political actors who participate in other areas, in addition to the
war area.
Scenario N°2: There
are no advances in the peace process and the dirty war intensifies,
making NGOs more vulnerable. This would constitute a more serious situation
than there was ten years ago, since the AUC as well as the guerrilla would
have already gained ground, neither of them recognizing International Humanitarian
Law nor the role that civil society has come to play. It is a scenario
in which civil society is left unprotected.
Scenario N°3: Incorporating
all actors in the process becomes possible (including the AUC) and
the weight of Civil Society is so high that the humanization of the conflict
and respect for International Humanitarian Law are achieved.
We find ourselves in Scenario
N°1, but it is perfectly possible for the situation to evolve toward
N°2 or N°3. In the transition between N°1 and N°2 we move
within a series of context reducing spaces. Where, the most vulnerable
members of the population finds it increasingly difficult to enjoy any
form of attention, where rights become rhetorical and distant, and destiny
is left in the hands of armed groups with their brutality and manipulation.
Keeping in mind all of the
above, it is impossible to recognize that, working with our mandates and
institutional identities, we International Agencies work with counterparts
and national and foreign organizations that in recent years have been attacked
(not to say decimated) and whose rights have clearly been ignored and violated.
Since our position is legitimate and protected by national and international
law pronounced in defense of the rights, not just those of the Colombian
people, but also those of our counterparts and sister organizations.
All of this means that, we
- the Agencies that form part of DIAL and other sister agencies- could
easily be "branded". That is, we may be referred to as "reactionary" (by
one group of actors), or "revolutionary and subversive" by other groups
of actors, and "useful idiots of subversion" by other groups. In addition,
it is possible that others will point to our organization as a source of
economic resources and that they see value in achieving "economic compensation"
through kidnapping (or retaining) our staff.
We could be part of that
other trend, throughout the world as well, characterized by the lack of
respect toward (international) humanitarian personnel. This has produced
many kidnappings and deaths (in Rwanda, in the Caucasus, etc.). The immediate
result is that the civilian population becomes less protected and has no
access to humanitarian aid.
To sum up, we may consider
these and many other possibilities, all to come to the same conclusion:
at the present juncture we are in a very high risk situation, and it is
necessary to become conscious of this fact.
1
This is a direct translation of "autodefensas",
the term used by these group themselves. It is more usual in English language
texts to use the term "paramilitary" (Translator's Note). |
